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ABSTRACT
While to date the Eurozone debt crisis is one of the most important and
consequential events in world politics of the twenty-first century, the actions
taken by states to negotiate a cooperative resolution do not seem particularly
puzzling. In this article, we employ the analytic explanation approach to
process tracing to test whether the most protracted and high-profile case –
negotiations between creditors led by Germany, and Greece as debtor state –
indeed validate three central hypotheses of basic cooperation theory regarding
the sources of bargaining strength. We conclude that while bargaining leverage
did emerge primarily from the ability to withstand non-agreement, the weaker
Greece was able to achieve marginal concessions reflecting terms that
departed from Germany’s initial win-set. This leverage stemmed however not
from a threat based on domestic political constraints, but from the realization
that Greece’s structural economic weakness rendered the strictest austerity
measures untenable. The policy implication is that the credibility of the weaker
side’s negotiating signal arose not from domestic politics, but the impartial
assessments of international technocrats and private rating agencies.
KEYWORDS Bargaining; credible signaling; cooperation; debt crisis; Eurozone; two-level games
Introduction
The Eurozone debt crisis that began in 2010 placed the members of the cur-
rency union in a precarious position. At several critical junctures, Eurozone
governments and institutional partners were urgently required to negotiate
cooperative agreements designed to achieve two related goals: preserving
the solvency of severely indebted periphery governments facing sovereign
debt defaults, and thereby protecting the value of that same debt held by
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banks from the Eurozone’s core. Failure to do so risked terrible consequences:
sovereign defaults, widespread bank failures and the possible collapse of the
Euro. To avoid this calamity, creditor governments would need to provide
injections of funds to finance the budget deficits of insolvent debtor govern-
ments. To address inevitable moral hazard problems, in return debtor govern-
ments had to implement harsh austerity measures, which would also serve to
stabilize public finances and restore the confidence of international financial
markets. Implementing this two-pronged approach posed significant techni-
cal and political hurdles. Technically, the negotiated agreements had to be
robust enough to assure international financial markets of the long-term via-
bility of periphery public finances. Politically, the agreements had to survive
significant domestic opposition and its attendant electoral consequences
within both debtor and creditor nations. Yet despite numerous doomsday
predictions, at each juncture negotiators found a way to agree, staving off
the insolvency of debtor governments and in doing so potentially saving
the entire single currency project.
Scholarship focusing on these momentous events is beginning to emerge
(Hennessy 2017; Matthijs 2016; Pitsoulis and Schwuchow 2017; Schimmelfen-
ning 2015; Schneider and Slantchev 2018; Tsebelis 2016; Zahariadis 2016a,
2016b). In light of the basic theoretical approaches to bargaining and
cooperation, it is notable how unsurprising the most important outcomes
were. As an example of creditor–debtor negotiations, with dynamics somewhat
paralleling the 1980s debt crises in Mexico and Brazil, the headline outcomes
from Eurozone agreements appear to conform to orthodox expectations. Con-
sider the most high-profile negotiations between creditors led by Germany, and
Greece as the debtor: each side came to the negotiating table with win-sets
defined by domestic politics, with governments on both sides incentivized by
economic interdependence to agree on a bailout deal. Yet creditors enjoyed
a greater capacity to withstand the costs of non-cooperation and this asym-
metric interdependence meant that negotiated outcomes predominantly
reflected German preferences (Schimmelfenning 2015).
Is that the end of the story? In this article, we employ evidence from the
three discrete bailout agreements concluded between Greece and its credi-
tors, led by Germany, in 2010, 2012 and 2015 to test three basic hypotheses
from cooperation theory in the context of international debt crisis nego-
tiations. The first is that bargaining strength arises from the capacity to with-
stand the costs of non-agreement (Fearon 1998) – or, that Germany was
always going to ‘win’ against a financially crippled Greece. The second is
the ‘Schelling Conjecture’ – the claim that even the weaker side in a nego-
tiation can achieve a relatively more beneficial outcome by credibly tying
its hands, in this case by arguing that the final agreement is subject to dom-
estic constraints (Putnam 1988; Schelling 1960; Tarar 2005) – or, that Greece
could use its tumultuous domestic politics as leverage to reduce the severity
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of imposed austerity measures. The third is that international or ‘Level 1’ nego-
tiators can employ various tactics to influence the domestic politics of their
opponents in order to improve outcomes – the concept of ‘reverberation’
(Putnam 1988; Schoppa 1993) – in this case that German negotiators were
able to shift public opinion within Greece in favor of Berlin’s favored bailout
agreement, and vice versa.
We distinguish our contribution in two ways. The first is in analytic
description by seeking to identify – with greater precision than is found in
the existing literature – the ideal points and win-sets brought by Greece
and Germany to all three bailout negotiations. Doing so requires extensive
sourcing, and we present most of this evidence systematically in a separate
empirical appendix in the spirit of active citation (Moravcsik 2010). Second,
this description facilitates the use of process tracing to test hypotheses
regarding the sources of bargaining power. We find that the conventional
view that the negotiated agreements predominantly reflected Germany’s
superior leverage (Schimmelfenning 2015) misses an important detail; on
occasion, Greece was able to extract some minor but meaningful conces-
sions representing departures from the German ideal-point. Importantly,
such leverage came not via the successful signaling of domestic political
constraints per the Schelling Conjecture, but because impartial technocratic
experts credibly validated Greece’s structural economic weakness. We con-
clude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of these
findings.
International debt crisis negotiations: theoretical framework
The continued integration of states’ financial markets has increasingly meant
that modern financial and debt crises have cross-border effects that constrain
the policy options available to governments and require international
cooperation to resolve (Cerny 1995). Fearon (1998) argues that international
cooperation is characterized by a common strategic structure in which the
negotiating parties must overcome two problems: a bargaining problem
regarding the distribution of new or potential benefits, and an enforcement
problem where monitoring and enforcement mechanisms may be needed
to disincentivize defection from concluded agreements. While cooperation
is contingent on each party gaining a minimum benefit (their ‘reservation
price’), the overall distribution of benefits is determined by relative bargaining
power – primarily a function of the status quo costs in the absence of an
agreement, or the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, BATNA
(Raiffa 1982: 252–53; Zahariadis 2016a: 677).
Debt crises often deny their victims palatable outside options as the threat
of default looms. Debtor governments are unable to access international
financial markets at affordable interest rates to finance expenditures and
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meet debt obligations. Creditors as holders of sovereign debt face deteriorat-
ing balance sheets, in turn reducing the value of investments and creating sys-
temic risk for interdependent economies (Lehman and McCoy 1992). The
variation in outside options among parties is a form of asymmetric interde-
pendence (Keohane and Nye 1977), in which the party enjoying superior
alternatives can better withstand non-agreement and thus retains the bar-
gaining advantage to win a relatively larger share of the payoffs from
cooperation (Schimmelfenning 2015).1
Putnam (1988) drew attention to the fact that international bargaining is con-
ditioned by domestic politics; negotiators are unwilling to enter agreements that
would impose significant costs ondomestic constituencies and thus threaten the
government’s political survival. Powerful domestic groups can prevent the dom-
estic ratification of a concluded agreement they deemunfavorable to their inter-
ests (Iida 1993). Ratificationconstraintsnarrowthe rangeof acceptableoutcomes
for government negotiators – theirwin-sets – and, aswin-sets narrow, amutually
acceptable agreement becomes less likely. However, Putnamalso theorized that
domestic dynamics can be influenced by the actions of international negotiators
themselves, a process he termed ‘reverberation’. By deploying inducements or
coercive threats, negotiators can reshape thepolicypreferencesofdomestic con-
stituents and thus the win-sets facing opponent negotiators. Schoppa (1993)
extended this logic, positing further mechanisms through which reverberation
could operate, such as by expanding the size of the participating constituency,
from elites to the mass public.
The two-level game can be readily extended to the dynamic between a gov-
ernment facing a sovereign debt crisis negotiating with its international credi-
tors (Lehman and McCoy 1992). Debtor governments affected by declining
asset prices and capital outflows are modeled as facing a tradeoff: shifting
costs onto foreign investors (‘creditors’) through debt reductions (‘haircuts’),
currency devaluation, or outright default creates the risk of non-agreement
and retaliation from creditors through protracted debt renegotiations, costly
litigation by holdouts and the long-term exclusion from international financial
markets, as was the case for Argentina following its 2001 default (Porzecanski
2005; Yue 2010). However, accepting the alternative of implementing harsh
austerity policies to facilitate a debt accord inevitably reduces real output
and employment and will anger workers and firms, igniting domestic opposi-
tion (Lehman and McCoy 1992). Creditors, which may be other governments,
international financial institutions or banks, face a similar tradeoff: ask too
much from the debtor and risk a no-agreement default and huge losses on
existing investments, but ask too little and face retaliation from their own
side, whether voters in the case of creditor governments, and members/share-
holders in the case of international financial institutions and banks.
Where a debtor faces financial collapse, its (relatively) more secure credi-
tors will enjoy a superior BATNA and should, therefore, capture a larger
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share of distributive gains. However, a strong domestic constraint, such as the
ability of a legislature to vote down an agreement, could counter-intuitively
increase the weaker side’s bargaining power because it can allow a negotiator
to argue that unfavorable terms would fail domestic ratification. Putnam took
this insight from Thomas Schelling (1960), and subsequent research – both
case studies and formal modeling – has explored the conditions under
which such constraints – dubbed the ‘Schelling Conjecture’ – may affect bar-
gaining power (Evans et al. 1993). No consensus has emerged; one vein of
scholarship focuses on the distinction between complete and incomplete
information (Milner and Rosendorff 1997; Tarar 2001), another disaggregates
the domestic constituencies of the executive and legislature and allows the
preferences of the respective groups to vary (Mo 1994; Tarar 2005). Clark
et al. (2000) argue the Conjecture is necessary to understand the empirics
of United States–European Union (EU) trade negotiations. In the specific
domain of debt negotiations, Lehman and McCoy’s (1992: 640–42) study of
Brazilian debt negotiations in the 1980s found domestic weakness was a
source of bargaining strength, improving the debtor’s gains from the nego-
tiated agreement.
We follow Schimmelfenning’s (2015: 179) approach to studying the Euro-
zone crisis in drawing upon these theoretical perspectives to develop specific
expectations, or hypotheses, to test against the empirical record. Where the
evidence leads us to reject a hypothesis, our research design pivots from
theory testing to heuristic theory development (George and Bennett 2005:
75) in which we utilize the evidence to identify new variables and/or causal
mechanisms to assist with future theory development.
Hypothesis 1: Creditors will capture a disproportionately larger share of the
benefits of cooperation because they can better withstand the costs of non-
agreement.
Hypothesis 2: The credible domestic constraints signalled by the debtor will
improve its share of the benefits of cooperation (the Schelling Conjecture).
Hypothesis 3: Negotiators’ threats or inducements can ‘reverberate’ through
the domestic politics of the opposing side, changing the prospects for
agreement.
Case selection and research design
To simplify our analysis of the broad and complex series of debt nego-
tiations conducted during the Eurozone crisis, we limit the scope of our
inquiry to the most prominent subset: negotiations between Greece as
debtor and Germany as the representative creditor. The case of Greece is
arguably the most fertile ground for theory testing because the Greek gov-
ernment received three separate negotiated bailouts in 2010, 2012 and
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2015, with the negotiations occurring in discrete and intensely scrutinized
episodes bounded by externally imposed refinancing deadlines, with each
set of negotiations yielding a cooperative agreement, thereby facilitating
a comparison of each party’s initial position with the negotiated
outcome. Germany’s leadership role within the Eurozone saw it
widely cast as the representative creditor, with much scrutiny of the
politics of the negotiations within Germany, and ‘Germany vs. Greece’ as
the core media narrative. Accordingly, we consider this a ‘crucial’ case
(George and Bennett 2005: 120) that established theories should aspire
to explain.2
Our research design is structured as follows. For each bailout, we first
seek to identify the ideal-point outcomes for each side and, to the extent
possible, the parameters of their win-sets. We then inquire whether, how,
and why the final agreement deviated from these initial objectives. Hypoth-
esis 1 posits that negotiated outcomes would be far closer to the German
ideal-point because the consequences of non-agreement for Greece were
worse. Hypothesis 2 posits that Greece could leverage domestic political
constraints to bring final outcomes closer to its ideal. Hypothesis 3 posits
that negotiators’ strategies could affect the final agreement via their
impact on the opponent’s domestic politics. Our methodology is qualitative,
relying on a particular type of process tracing that George and Bennett term
‘analytic explanation’, seeking to convert a historical narrative into an
analytical causal explanation and facilitate hypothesis testing (George and
Bennett 2005: 211; Kourtikakis 2010: 28). The hypotheses do not offer an
exhaustive list of causal factors; where the evidence points to rejection of
a hypothesis, our case study methodology pivots to the heuristic theory-
building purpose.
We rely on publicly available resources, such as speeches, media interviews
and media reporting. Importantly, the hypothesis testing process necessitates
reliance on contestable empirical evidence, insofar as we draw inferences and
make judgments regarding the initial negotiating positions of the parties and
the reasons why a concluded outcome (the only category of truly observable
fact) differed from any initial position. To maximize transparency and facilitate
robust and critical scrutiny of these inherently uncertain judgments (especially
should new evidence become available), as well as the replicability of our find-
ings in the spirit of active citation (Moravcsik 2010, 2014), accompanying this
paper is an online appendix in which we set out our empirical conclusions –
organized consistently with our theoretical framework – referenced exten-
sively by the sources relied upon to draw those conclusions. Such depth
would be infeasible within the confines of the paper itself, which moreover
frees us to omit most referencing from our analytical narrative below, other
than to source arguably some of the most contested and interesting factual
points.
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Sources of bargaining power in Eurozone debt crisis
negotiations
The first bailout of Greece: heavy concessions from both sides in the
face of collapse and contagion
In the beginning of 2010, the Greek government found itself in a perfect
storm surrounding the sustainability of government finances and, at first,
it could do no more than deny the severity of the situation. Following an
upward revision of the budget deficit for 2009 to 12.7 percent, Prime Min-
ister George Papandreou’s newly elected government announced an exten-
sive package of austerity measures to appease financial markets. At the
same time, government officials denied the need for a special bailout agree-
ment with European partners and insisted on accessing private markets
even a few days before such agreement was finalized in late April 2010.
The ideal outcome for Greece would be a commitment by its Eurozone part-
ners to provide financial help if needed, with a minimum of politically unpa-
latable austerity measures. Once Greek access to the private markets was
blocked, the government’s ideal position shifted gradually towards an orga-
nized restructuring or lessening of the Greek debt, but rumors of such shift
upset the stocks of Greek banks and were not made public. It quickly
became clear that the low-end boundary of the Greek win-set was deter-
mined by the enormous costs of a potential default and exit from the Euro-
zone. ‘Anything but Grexit’ would become a recurring theme in the
speeches of the numerous Greek Prime Ministers and Ministers of Finance
during the following five years.
German officials, representing Greece’s creditors, were extremely reluctant
to commit to a financial assistance mechanism in early 2010. Following revel-
ations that the Greek government used logistical manipulations to hide
budget deficits, German domestic opinion was against participation in any
assistance program and even favored letting Greece exit the Eurozone. Did
a Greek default and potential exit from the Eurozone feature as the lower
bound of the German win-set in early 2010? Although a number of MPs
from the governing coalition (namely, the Bavarian Christian Union and the
Free Democratic Party) expressed views to that effect, and Chancellor
Angela Merkel herself cast doubt on the decision to accept Greece into the
Eurozone in the first place, on balance it was never considered a serious possi-
bility by senior German officials. Germany also opposed an official recognition
of the lack of sustainability of Greek refinancing for fear that this unprece-
dented admission would induce debt contagion in other Eurozone countries.
Non-committal language by German leaders as late as March 2010 shows that,
although secret plans already existed for a publicly funded bailout, their ideal
preference point for resolving the crisis involved imposing austerity upon
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Greece without using funds from German public coffers for international
loans, but instead turning to multilateral institutions to address the problem.3
Greece did eventually receive extensive financial help in 2010, amounting
to €110 billion and agreed to rigorous fiscal adjustment, lowering government
spending, pension reform and a range of other difficult austerity measures. It
was not, however, granted any debt restructuring despite the recommen-
dations of many economists and reservations of non-European International
Monetary Fund (IMF) executive-board members about the feasibility of the
program’s targets (Economides and Smith 2011; Wall Street Journal 2013).
The IMF played second fiddle in its arrangement with the European Commis-
sion and the European Central Bank, and these concerns were not reflected in
the joint position taken by this ‘Troika’. The austerity measures were deemed
even harsher than the ones already implemented by the Papandreou govern-
ment leading up to the bailout negotiations. The logic of the ‘Memorandum of
Understanding’ between Greece and its creditors instructed an early, front-
loaded deficit reduction with negative effects on the country’s GDP in hope
of a swift turnaround. Violent riots erupted in Greek cities, notably in front
of the Parliament building. The polling percentages of PASOK, the dominant
political party in Greece for four decades, would never recover from the elec-
toral shock of the implementation period of the first Memorandum.
Germany, like Greece, also had to make large concessions and depart from
its ideal preference point because of the risks for German and other European
institutions and the uncertainty over contagion effects to other Eurozone
countries that had already begun to manifest. The German parliament
approved participation in the financing facility (EFSF) that provided emer-
gency financing to Greece and other Eurozone members. Germany was over-
whelmingly the largest contributor and the unpopularity of the program was
reported to contribute to the resounding defeat of the ruling Christian Demo-
cratic Union in the Nord Rhein-Westphalia regional elections a few days later.
Schneider and Slantchev (2018: 24) note that the timing of Germany’s pivot
towards an agreement in late April and early May put Merkel in an ‘inherently
weak’ domestic position even though she did not extend substantive conces-
sions to Greece. Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble were forced
to concede on the timing considering the danger of contagion to private
financial institutions and other Eurozone states, a danger reflected in the
depreciating Euro and the increasing bond yields for other members. The
tone struck by Schäuble in his Bundestag speech before the vote is indicative
of the sense of concessions made: ‘Any other alternative would be much more
expensive for the German state, it would be much more dangerous, it would
take up many more risks’ (Wearden 2010).4
Accordingly, our conclusion is that Greece and its creditors settled for a
necessary but costly deal. The distribution of costs weighed more heavily
on Greece, the side threatened by imminent collapse; however, the
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uncertainty that lay in a potential Greek default for German financial insti-
tutions and the Euro as a whole meant that the final outcome differed signifi-
cantly from the German government’s ideal. Overall, domestic politics in the
form of upcoming elections, opinion polls and large-scale demonstrations did
not provide leverage to Greece, because potentially large electoral losses did
not act as credible constraints. Contagion, uncertainty and unity of the
common currency, that is, the consequences of high levels of interdepen-
dence were in the minds of everyone. Public statements by Greek and
German leaders were aimed at ‘speculators’ rather than the actions of national
governments and thus there is little evidence of reverberation attempts at this
point. One possible exception was the claim by the Greek Deputy Prime Min-
ister that Germany was profiting from the crisis and that Germany owed war
reparations, but these comments did not attract significant attention in
Germany. The reparations issue would, however, feature more prominently
in negotiations between the parties that led to the 2015 bailout.
The second bailout of Greece: credit-rating agencies and erroneous
performance projections soften Greek concessions
Throughout 2011 it became increasingly clear that Greecewould need a second
bailout package, a likelihood portended in particular by the downgrading of
Greek government bonds to near-junk status in the first half of 2011 by inter-
national credit-rating agencies. The Greek economy was underperforming –
albeit with disagreement regarding whether this was due to the burden
imposed by austerity, or because austerity was being insufficiently
implemented – and the projections of EU and IMF officials for Greek growth
were quickly becoming unrealistic. Thus even before the novelty of bailing
out a Eurozone country hadworn off, Europeanofficialswere facedwith increas-
ing rumors of a disorderly default with huge losses for Greek and international
banks. The Greek win-set was, once again, delimited by the scenario of this
default and a possible exit from the Eurozone, which remained Athens’ worst-
case scenario (Erlanger 2011). The ideal outcome of the second negotiations,
however, included a number of new dimensions, besides the extent of austerity
measures. The Greek ideal position combined a change in repayment terms of
the original bailout, a ‘haircut’ accepted by all bondholders with special protec-
tions for Greek banks to cushion the effects of the nominal losses, a mutualiza-
tion of European debt and a less onerous austerity package. The self-fulfilling
dynamic of public statements during the extended period of negotiations
and the heavy domestic opposition forced Greek negotiators to camouflage
their preferences, but the published memoires of the two Greek Finance Minis-
ters of that period, George Papaconstantinou and Evangelos Venizelos, confirm
the above as the main objectives of the Greek negotiating team during that
period (Papaconstantinou 2016: 194–95; Venizelos 2017: 5–6).
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The German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, recognized the need for
a new program as early as February 2011, therefore the German government’s
win-set during the second bailout negotiations did not include a threat to
abandon negotiations or to force Greece out of an agreement. The ideal pre-
ference point of the German government coalition, which included the more
hostile minor partner, the Free Democrats, became clearer by mid-2011; it
comprised more austerity for Greece and no changes in the terms of the
2010 bailout agreement, but recognized the need to distribute the costs of
a new bailout more widely, through a combination of public- and private-
sector involvement. Comparing the two ideal-point preferences, one could
argue that the two countries were at their closest during this period, as
they both agreed largely on the need for extensive private-sector involve-
ment. However, as their respective publics grew increasingly hostile to the
conditions of the bailout agreements, the tone of negotiations was signifi-
cantly more combative despite the closeness of the two sides’ negotiating
positions.
The negotiated outcome was nevertheless closer to the German position.
There was a large, voluntary ‘haircut’ sustained by private-sector partners in
the agreement through a bond rollover – at 53.5 percent, the largest of
such kind in the history of financial crises – and no equivalent nominal
haircut for government-backed loans. Perhaps as importantly, the Greek gov-
ernment agreed to impose further painful austerity measures, including a sig-
nificant minimum wage reduction, pension cuts and a substantial decrease in
public sector employees. Greek opposition parties rightly predicted that the
imposed debt restructuring would negatively affect the balance sheets of
already strained domestic banks and pension funds. But creditors, including
Germany, made a number of concessions to Greece that fell outside their
initial win-set. In a marathon summit in July 2011, Greece secured an
additional €130 billion of financial assistance, and moreover a retroactive
reduction in the interest rates attached to the first bailout loans, the grant
of a 10-year grace period before loan repayment, and provisions for the repay-
ment to the Greek government of any income accruing to European central
banks from Greek government bonds held in their investment portfolios. In
addition, the international press at the time estimated that the imposed aus-
terity measures fell short of that sought by the more ‘hawkish’ elements in
Angela Merkel’s coalition government. Thus an evaluation of the distribution
of payoffs reveals that the deal was definitely closer to the German than Greek
ideal position, especially with regard to continuing austerity; however,
Greece’s aforementioned gains should not be underestimated.
What can account for such comparatively minor but quite real gains? It was
surely not any kind of domestic political leverage; indeed, the new austerity
measures forced Greek PM George Papandreou to resign from his post in
November 2011, following his gamble to announce a referendum on the
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deal – a referendum humiliatingly called off after Angela Merkel and French
President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that the referendum could not be
about the acceptance of further austerity measures, but would rather
decide the continuation of Greece in the Eurozone. The prospect of upcoming
Greek elections or defections of MPs was factored by creditors into nego-
tiations mainly as a potentially costly delay of inevitable measures
(Wearden 2012). There is also, not unlike before the first bailout, little evidence
of reverberation – Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou only visited
Berlin in late-2011, after the bailout agreement had been agreed upon,
although the positive reception by the German press seemed to have
eased the way towards an acceptance of further financial aid towards Greece.
Ultimately, the concessions made to Greece, especially in the form of
improved terms on existing loans and the private-sector ‘haircut’, were
granted only when it became clear that Greece’s debt burden was simply
unsustainable. Importantly, these conclusions were founded upon the credible
information provided both by private credit-rating agencies and the IMF. The
first half of 2011 saw the ratings agencies furnish downward performance pro-
jections of the Greek economy and statements that Greek debt was unsustain-
able. On 7 March, for example, Moody’s downgraded the creditworthiness of
Greek state bonds by three degrees with negative outlook and five days
later, the European creditors agreed to lower interest rates of Greek loans by
1 percent and to extend the repayment period to 7.5 years. In the first half
of June, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s downgraded the Greek bonds
further to the C-category, approaching ‘junk’ status, which brought about
the direct concessions of the July summit (lower interest rates, extended
grace periods) detailed above. The two rating agencies cited the overly ambi-
tious goals set by the program for Greece and the poor record of the Greek
state in achieving tax-collecting goals as the main reasons behind their
decisions. Greek Finance Minister Papaconstantinou confirms in his memoire
that the reactions of the rating agencies prohibited further delays:
The informal Eurogroup and ECOFIN meetings convened on June 14th, one day
after S & P cut Greece’s sovereign credit rating to CCC, the lowest grade for any
country it reviewed in the world … we were clearly running out of time and
decisions would have to be taken at the formal Eurogroup scheduled for June
20th [2011]. (Papaconstantinou 2016: 209)
Ofﬁcial Greek statistics, whennot downright unreliable, repeatedly underscored
the worse-than-expected performance of tax receipts and the persistent nega-
tive spiral of economic activity (Tagesschau 2011). The IMF, despite reeling from
the dramatic resignation ofManagingDirector Dominique Strauss-Kahn inMay,
nevertheless added to the credibility of these claims, reporting in July on the
‘heroic assumptions’ underlying debt-sustainability projections. Thus creditors
were faced with a very real prospect of disorderly default – a costlier outcome
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thankeepingGreeceaﬂoat–but the evidenceof that camenot fromsignals sent
byGreekgovernmentor loomingelections, but thehighlightingbynon-govern-
mental credit-rating agencies of structural economic realities.
The third bailout of Greece: the IMF softens Greek capitulation
The third round of bailout negotiations took place in the first half of 2015 and
culminated in a standoff in June–July. The situation became so grave that it
prompted European Council President Donald Tusk to speak of the ‘most critical
five days in the history of the European Union’ and Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker to reveal a Commission plan for humanitarian assistance to
Greece in the event of a Grexit. In January 2015 a radical-left party, SYRIZA,
won national elections, and promptly formed a vehemently anti-austerity
coalition government with a small right-wing populist party, Independent
Greeks, promising to radically renegotiate agreements with creditors. Over the
next six months, the Greek government and its creditors reached what
seemed to be a genuine impasse, with both sides delaying procedures and no
side showing willingness to make any meaningful concessions on crucial
aspects of the program.
One should not underestimate the initial differences between the two sides,
but nor should one ignore the convergence achieved before the final July agree-
ment. SYRIZA came topowerpromisingwage andpension increases, tax repeals,
a renegotiationof theonerousprimary surpluses imposedonGreecebyprevious
agreements and some debt relief, but it is more realistic to determine the party’s
win-set and ideal position from an interim agreement theymade with the coun-
try’s creditors in February 2015. At the time, the newGreek government success-
fully extended the existing financial assistance program and backpedaled on
many electoral promises with regard to pensions, public sector wages and priva-
tizations, but neither the agreed statement nor Greek government ministers
addressed various important issues regarding fiscal consolidation. The Greek
government’s ideal position, based on statements of the responsible ministers
during the period prior to the January elections, probably included the elimin-
ation of primary surpluses as a condition for financial assistance, the curtailment
of planned privatizations, a renegotiation of pension system reforms and excep-
tional spending on the country’s ‘humanitarian crisis’. There is considerable
debate on whether a unilateral default and exit from the Eurozone was included
in the win-set of the newGreek government. Although never admitted officially,
the possibility of a parallel monetary system of IOUs was processed by a secret
unit of theMinistryof Finance.5GreekPrimeMinisterAlexis Tsipras later admitted
in a closed session of the parliamentary group what his predecessors had stated
publicly, namely that anexit from the Eurozone ran the risk of ‘anexplosionof the
state apparatus’, essentially further limiting the set of possible options for the
Greek government (Kathimerini 2015).
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On the other hand, the German position, notwithstanding a well-documen-
ted rift between Chancellor Merkel and the ever-dismissive Finance Minister
Wolfgang Schäuble, remained essentially steadfast: not much change from
the 2012 agreement could be achieved in areas such as fiscal targets, pension
system cuts, privatizations and labor market reforms. In fact, the German pos-
ition hardened progressively (in the sense of rhetorically expanding the accep-
table costs of non-cooperation)with severalMPs re-igniting the idea thatGreece
should be assisted to leave the Eurozone. The final days of negotiations in late
June, featured dramatic developments despite an earlier convergence towards
a proposal of the Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. Tsipras broke the
negotiationdeadlock by calling a referendumon the Juncker proposal and cam-
paigning against it. Greek banks closed for several days and capital controls
were imposed, and Greece failed to make a payment to the IMF, the first
OECD country ever to do so. A resounding ‘No’ in the referendum led German
and Commission officials to prepare for a unilateral default and exit of the
country from the Eurozone, with the German Finance Minister explicitly
putting a Grexit plan on the table. In the end, however, Tsipras succumbed to
a third bailout agreement in what has been widely regarded as a total capitula-
tion. The Greek government agreed to a new bailout agreement until 2018,
which extended commitments to long-term fiscal surpluses, created a privatiza-
tion fund co-managed by the Greek government and its creditors and estab-
lished an automatic fiscal readjustment mechanism.
The distance between ideal and final outcomes was larger for Greece and
smaller for Germany compared to the previous two bailouts. In the interven-
ing three years since the last bailout the costs of defection had remained pro-
hibitively high for Greece and included the sunk costs of five years of austerity,
but had decreased for Germany: German financial institutions had already
absorbed the costs of the 2012 ‘haircut’ and the rest of the Eurozone was
shielded by better growth prospects and the monetary operations of the
European Central Bank. However, it would again be incorrect to assume
that creditors made no concessions to Greece whatsoever. Primary surplus
targets were revised downwards for 2015–2017 and only in 2018 did the
new package require a return to primary surpluses of 3.5 percent. Commission
President Juncker pledged €35 billion of various investment funds from the
EU budget to be used in various public- and private-sector initiatives until
2020. Perhaps most importantly, the IMF widely publicized a report revealing
heretofore-concealed skepticism towards the sustainability of the Greek debt
both in the buildup and the aftermath of the negotiations.
Greece’s comparatively erratic movement from an ideal position to the final
deal can again be explainedwith reference to the catastrophic consequences of
a failure to agree. Greece gave some ground early in 2015 but in March neither
Greece nor Germany felt they could make further concessions. Bellicose nego-
tiating tactics by Tsipras and Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, including
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repeatedly raising the issue of German war reparations, only served to worsen
relations with creditors. Yet a failure to return to the table and reach agreement
by July would cause disorderly default. Ultimately, Tsipras was forced to break
with his coalition and return with concessions to the negotiating table in May,
where the cycle then repeated. Tsipras again broke from his coalition and
returned to the negotiating table with five ‘red lines’ – areas where he would
refuse to accept austerity. Yet creditors would not accept Tsipras’s red lines,
and Greece’s intransigence failed to elicit further concessions. In July, Tsipras
had no choice but to return with an offer of decreased pensions and increased
VAT that was again rejected as insufficient. As above, Tsipras responded with a
referendum that rejected the creditors’ proposals but succeeded only in upset-
ting creditors. All else having failed, it appearsGreece’s PrimeMinister ultimately
agreed to creditors’ demands because the consequences of doing otherwise
were so severe. Hence a clear pattern emerged in 2015 where unsuccessful
Greek intransigence was followed by unsuccessful, provocative negotiating
tactics and the ‘illusion of control’ (Zahariadis 2016b: 488), leaving Greece no
choice but to offer concessions in line with creditor demands or accept the cat-
astrophic consequences of non-agreement.
Although Greece was unable to pressure creditors into making concessions
with intransigence, concessions followed when it was clear that Greek struc-
tural issues rendered creditors’ positions unworkable. Already in May, IMF offi-
cials threatened to walk out of negotiations if European creditors did not
agree to write off part of the country’s accumulated long-term debt. The
IMF Chief Economist reiterated this position in a much-publicized blog post
addressed to the public two weeks before negotiations collapsed (Blanchard
2015; Spiegel and Donnan 2015). IMF pressure, including official debt-sustain-
ability analyses, later led in December 2016 to agreements on short-term debt
relief measures, although these did not completely allay the Fund’s concerns.
The statutory obligation of the IMF to participate in financial assistance pro-
grams only if the debt of the assisted countries is considered sustainable, as
well as the reluctance of non-European countries to resume contributions
to a comparatively wealthy European country, essentially forced Germany
and other European creditors to act on non-private debt relief.
Much like the previous two bailout agreements, domestic political exigen-
cies did not seriously affect the substance of concessions made by the two
sides. In the case of Greece, this could not be more spectacularly demon-
strated than by Tsipras’ volte-face following a resounding popular rejection
of austerity in the Greek referendum. In the German case, the political impera-
tive to keep the IMF in the Greek bailout program6 eventually forced the
German government to make concessions and did not serve as a credible
commitment to hold an intransigent position. The final, cooperative
outcome seems unremarkable, indeed trivial to explain: an agreement was
always less costly than the alternatives for both parties.
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Again, however, the puzzle arises from a less lopsided distribution of payoffs
than widely believed. Ultimately, Greece secured some important gains and, as
Donald Tusk later described, at the final summit both sides asked to leave the
negotiating table over a mere 2.5 billion in an ‘authentic reaction … as both
were absolutely sure that they had compromised too much’. There is very
little evidence for the positive effects of reverberation – of Greek leaders
directly trying to influence German public opinion. Although Tsipras’ March
2015 Berlin visit left a good impression and eased negotiations, Varoufakis’
public comments in June (most notably comparing Greece to the Weimar
Republic before a German audience) were regarded as counter-productive. A
more important change from the second bailout was that international
credit-rating agencies did not play an important role in signaling that the
Greeks had reached their limits, because prices of Greek bonds had not
regained their status as credible signalingmechanisms. Where did the credible
signal that Greece could not bear higher costs come from? As already
explained, debt-sustainability analyses provided by the IMF (and corroborated,
to some extent, by European Commission officials) impelled Germany and
other European creditors to provide concessions to Greece, absent the fears
of contagion and any credible signals from financial markets that a default
was imminent. The leaked minutes of an internal IMF teleconference
between Poul Thomsen, the head of the IMF’s European Department, and
Delia Velculescu, the IMF Mission Chief for Greece, reveal the renewed role of
the IMF as the carrier of credible signals for concessions to European creditors:
Thomsen: ‘I am not going accept a package of small measures. I am not… ’
said Thomsen. ‘What is going to bring it all to a decision point? In
the past there has been only one time when the decision has
been made and then that was when the Greeks were about to
run out of money seriously and to default.… And possibly this
is what is going to happen again.’ …
Velculescu: … the Germans raise the issue of the management… and basi-
cally we at that time say ‘Look, you Mrs. Merkel you face a ques-
tion, you have to think about what is more costly: to go ahead
without the IMF, would the Bundestag say “The IMF is not on
board”? or to pick the debt relief that we think that Greece
needs in order to keep us on board?’ Right? That is really the
issue. (To Vima 2016)
Conclusion
Despite its status as one of the most important and potentially consequential
events in world politics in the twenty-first century, the outcomes of the Euro-
zone crisis – and in particular the Greek bailout negotiations – are not
especially puzzling to students of cooperation theory. Yet even the simple nar-
rative – that the parties preferred costly bailouts to the prospect of dealing a
fatal blow to the monetary union, but that the weaker Greece consistently
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received the worst from the bargained agreements – is deserving of thorough
scrutiny, not least because embodied in such conclusions are factual assump-
tions regarding the parties’ win-sets and the factors determining the distri-
bution of benefits from cooperation. In this paper, we sought to test three
basic hypotheses on bargaining amid financial crisis, and in doing so compiled
a detailed appendix of qualitative empirical evidence from three Greek bailout
negotiations in 2010, 2012 and 2015, which we use to justify factual con-
clusions that nevertheless remain contestable.
Our empirical analysis largely conforms to the predictions of established
scholarship on financial crisis bargaining. The party that had more to lose
from non-cooperation and the continuation of the status quo (Greece)
departed from its ideal position more significantly than the party that could
wait out the negotiations (European creditors, represented by Germany).
However, we show that the negotiated agreements also reflected meaningful
concessions to Greece despite initial opposition – namely various forms of
partial debt relief – and such outcomes appear to lend support to the Schelling
Conjecture that bargaining strength can be derived from domestic constraint.
Our most novel finding is however that such constraints were sourced
neither in domestic politics nor reverberation. Pivoting from theory testing to
heuristic theory development, we highlight the importance of the debtor’s
structural economic weakness: a credible signal crystallized that Greece could
not bear the costs of further fiscal consolidation. A credible threat of unilateral
default arose not when Greek politicians resigned, or called early elections or
referenda, but when the inability of the Greek state to meet projected targets
became clear. This signal came not from the debtor government, but inter-
national actors. In 2012 this role was led by international credit-rating agencies
drawing from reporting by national and European statistical agencies on the
gross underperformance of the Greek economy, with the IMF following with
similar conclusions. During the 2015 negotiations, the IMF performed this func-
tion, giving impartial credibility to the signal that Greece’s economic weakness
limited the scope for continued austerity, and the resulting need to renegotiate
the terms of the bailout agreements further in Greece’s favor.
These findings carry an important policy implication: the credibility of the
weaker side’s signal is affected not by domestic political actors, but by the tech-
nocratic assessments of third parties like the IMF and international credit-rating
agencies. The Greek financial crisis reveals that debtor governments may be
more likely to gain concessions if they engage with such actors to establish
thematerial non-viability of austerity programs, rather than deployingdomestic
political constraints, such as elections or upcoming parliamentary votes. The
crisis also demonstrates how credible information from third parties can influ-
ence debt negotiations – suggesting that while organizations like the IMF
enjoy legitimacy and credibility as sources of impartial expertise, they will
retain significant influence in major episodes of global financial instability.
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Notes
1. Successful debt crisis negotiations do not yield positive payoffs; both sidesmust pay
costs in a cooperative outcome. Preventing contagion requires creditors to finance
costly bailouts and debt forgiveness. Debtors avoid financial collapse, but must
accept painful austerity measures. Such costs are still less than the catastrophic
risks of non-agreement, such as debtor default, large investment losses and conta-
gion for creditors, and second-order effects like a currency union collapse.
2. It also requires sensitivity in the empirical analysis to the possibility that depar-
tures from the German position were a function of intra-creditor bargaining –
which indeed was the case at least once vis-à-vis the IMF in 2015.
3. Germany’s stated interests were ‘negotiating in the European interest, and
demonstrating our commitment to Europe in defending the stability of the
euro’. A mechanism must ‘be triggered only once Greece had exhausted its
capacity to raise money on the international capital markets’: Peel et al. (2010).
4. Also see, Wolfgang Schaeuble’s (2010) speech before German Parliament.
5. The then Finance Minister later confirmed the existence of a contingency plan in
the event negotiations faltered (see official statement at https://yanisvaroufakis.
eu/2015/07/27/statement-by-yanis-varoufakis-on-the-finmins-plan-b-working-
group-the-parallel-payment-system/) and backed by his then advisor James
K. Galbraith.
6. Throughout, Berlin has insisted on IMF support because bailouts are politically
more acceptable in Germany if seen as an international undertaking.
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